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Abstract
We show that cyclical skill mismatch, defined as mismatch between the skills
supplied by college graduates and skills demanded by hiring industries, is an
important mechanism behind persistent career loss from graduating in recessions.
Using Norwegian data, we find a strong countercyclical pattern of skill mismatch
among college graduates. Initial labor market conditions have a declining but
persistent effect on match quality and skill mismatch early in their careers. Match
quality of the first employment may explain up to half of the short-term and most
of the long-term earnings loss from graduating in a recession. (JEL E32, J31,
J62).
1 Introduction
There is a growing literature showing that labor market conditions at the time of labor
market entry have large and persistent negative effects on careers. For example, recent
papers by Kahn (2010) and Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2012) show that
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college graduates in North America suffer persistent declines in earnings lasting up
to 10 years. Similar evidence has been found using data sets from other countries or
groups of graduates.1 Understanding the mechanisms driving these persistent career
losses is essential to the design of government employment programs aimed at helping
young workers.
While much is known about the overall magnitude and heterogeneity of these
highly persistent career losses, less work has been done on the mechanisms driving
the losses. It is difficult to explain the persistence in career losses from presumably
short-lived labor market shocks. The literature has pointed out that the quality of first
job placement is important in explaining the long-term career losses. Kwon, Milgrom,
and Hwang (2010) find that those who graduate in booms are promoted faster, even
when conditional on proxies for productivity. Oreopoulos et al. (2012) find that a lower
quality first job can explain the persistence of earnings losses, but only when com-
bined with search frictions that intensify with age. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013)
and Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter, Pamminger, Weber, and Winter-Ebmer (2012) provide evi-
dence that idiosyncratic match quality is affected by the tightness of the labor market.
Closely related to our paper, a recent paper by Altonji, Kahn, and Speer (2014) finds
that the early careers of higher-skilled majors in the US are less sensitive to labor
market conditions at graduation.
We add to this literature by showing that skill mismatch, which we understand as
mismatch between the skills supplied by college graduates and the skills demanded
by hiring industries, is another important mechanism behind the persistent career loss
from graduating in recessions. We analyze the matching over the business cycle be-
tween heterogeneous skills within each cohort of graduates and heterogeneous demand
for skills by hiring industries. We define the type of skill supplied as the field of study
in college. Mismatch occurs when a worker is matched to an industry that does not
value her/his skill, and we operationalize this using relative wage premia across col-
lege majors and industries (as such, our paper use a different definition of mismatch
than the literature that focus on mismatches in the level of education (Leuven and
Oosterbeek, 2011)).
1See Oyer (2006) (US), Brunner and Kuhn (2014) (Austria), Kondo (2007); Genda, Kondo, and
Ohta (2010) (Japan) and Stevens (2007) (Germany). Another related strand of literature focuses on the
long-term impact of initial labor market conditions facing youth or low skilled workers (Gardecki and
Neumark, 1998; Ellwood, 1982; Neumark, 2002; Burgess, Propper, Rees, and Shearer, 2003; Raaum
and Røed, 2006; Liu, Salvanes, and Sørensen, 2014). In that literature, there seems to be a reasonable
consensus that there is a persistent effect of youth unemployment on a worker’s career later in life.
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That students find jobs in industries they did not train for is in itself not problem-
atic. Presumably, they would only want to do so if this industry offered better career
prospects than the industry they trained for, and if new graduates have access to con-
sumption smoothing, school-to-job transitions that are classified as mismatches will be
efficient. But if new graduates cannot efficiently smooth consumption, they might be
forced to accept jobs that are bad long-term matches. They might not be able to afford
‘investing’ in a low-paying job of the sort they trained for, even if there are long-term
complementarities between schooling and experience. In such a case, mismatch might
be inefficient.2
Using administrative matched employer–employee panel data from Norway, we
first document that, like many other countries, an average Norwegian college graduate
has persistent earnings loss from bad initial labor market conditions. Interestingly,
the negative effects are more pronounced among graduates whose fields of study lead
to jobs with more cyclical demand, i.e., the private sector. College graduates with
degrees aimed at the public sector (education and health) which is more insulated
from business cycle shocks, show much less persistence of the initial (and smaller)
earnings loss. Using our specification of mismatch (wage premia), we show that there
is a strong counter-cyclical pattern of skill mismatch among college graduates entering
the labor market. A typical recession, with a rise in the unemployment rate by three
percentage points, implies an initial increase of about 30 percent in the probability of
mismatch. The effects of the initial labor market conditions on mismatch decline over
time but remain highly persistent over early careers, suggesting that some graduates
never switch back to the “right” industry.3 Our results survive a range of the robustness
checks including students’ timing of graduation and region of graduation relative to the
regional unemployment rates.
Establishing the persistence of the effects of graduating in a recession and that our
measures of mismatch are counter-cyclical, we followed the literature by using aggre-
gate cohort-region-time level data. To understand how much the negative wage effect
can be explained by match quality of the first employment, we exploit the advantage
2In an online appendix, we illustrate this in a two-period model in which heterogeneous skills de-
preciate if not used. In this setting, transitory shocks to productivity can have long-term consequences
because of the skill dynamics. In our model, with credit constraints and a minimum level of consump-
tion, mismatch can be inefficient, and there is more such inefficient mismatch in recessions.
3In addition, we use an alternative definition of mismatch by using relative worker flows across
majors and industries. These results support our main finding for wages in that a typical recession leads
to a 9 percent reduction in the average quality of matches.
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of individual-level data by including individual-level variables to control for match
quality of the first employment and compositional changes over the business cycle.
We find that both the short- and long-term effects of initial labor market conditions
are substantially lower once the match quality of the first employment is controlled
for. For instance, the effect on log earnings among men majoring in private-sector
fields is reduced by almost one half in the first two years after graduation. Initial lo-
cal labor market conditions also have a much less persistent effect during the early
stages of workers’ careers. In comparison, controlling for differences in the composi-
tion of graduates over the business cycle alone using proxies for cognitive ability has
minimal impacts on the effects of initial conditions. These findings suggest that the
cyclical mismatch of college graduates could be an important driving force behind the
persistent career loss.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our empirical strategy and
relates it to the literature. In Section 3 we present our data and situate our sample in
the context of the Norwegian business cycle before we provide our results in Section 4,
some tests of robustness in Section 5, and concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Empirical Strategy
In this section we describe our estimation strategy to identify the short- and long-term
effects of initial labor market conditions on skill mismatch and on a range of other
labor market outcomes.
2.1 Estimating the Short- and Long-term Effects of Initial Labor
Market Conditions
We approximate initial labor market conditions using the regional unemployment rate
at the time of graduation. Following Kahn (2010) and Oreopoulos et al. (2012), we use
the variations in business cycle conditions across regions within a cohort (above and
beyond the regional effects captured by the region fixed effect) to identify the causal
effects of graduating in recessions. The outcome variable in period t for a graduating
cohort c from region r is determined by the following linear model:
ycrt = β1 +∑
e
β e2Ucr0 +φt +θr+ γe+ γe×θr+ξc+ucrt , (1)
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in which θr,ξc,γe and φt are fixed effects for region of the college at the time of gradu-
ation, year of graduation (or graduating cohort, c), years of potential labor market ex-
perience and calendar year, respectively. Cohort fixed effects capture national changes
in the quality of graduates. Regional fixed effects capture the permanent characteris-
tics of the region. γe×θr captures different experience profiles by college region. Ucr0
is the regional unemployment rate measured at the time of graduation and the region
of the graduating school. The coefficients on the initial unemployment rate, β e2 , are
allowed to vary with the level of potential experience. The estimate of β e2 using ordi-
nary least squares identifies the short- and long- term changes in experience profiles
from region-cohort-specific variations in unemployment rates, given the regular evo-
lution of the regional unemployment rate faced in the future.4 The main identifying
assumption is that the variations in local unemployment rates arise from changes in
aggregate labor demand that are uncorrelated with the characteristics of different grad-
uation cohorts. In Section 5, we conduct a range of robustness checks to show that our
results are unaffected by selective timing of graduation and selective region of the first
employment.
As the main regressorUcr0 varies by region of graduation and cohort, we first clus-
ter our panel data into cells defined by cohort, calendar year, and region of graduation.
We then estimate equation (1) weighted by the corresponding cell sizes, and cluster
the standard errors at region of graduation and cohort level. We drop one additional
cohort effect from the regression in order to identify the cohort, experience, and year
effects separately.
2.2 Measuring Skill Mismatch
One of the key ingredients of estimation is to define which industries are good matches
and which industries are bad matches for graduates of a given major. While it is com-
mon perception that the finance industry is a good match for students majoring in busi-
ness, we are not aware of any studies that aim to quantify the quality of matches be-
tween college major and industries directly from micro data. Based on our conceptual
framework, we know that to measure skill mismatch, we need to estimate the vector of
efficiency units in different industries for each field of study m (ωm = {ω1m, . . . ,ωJm}).
4As the current state of regional labor markets continues to influence earnings of more experienced
workers, another estimate of interest is isolating the effect of labor market conditions at entry net of
subsequent effects on earnings from exposure to a possibly prolonged recession. We discuss this issue
in Section 5.3 of the paper.
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Our baseline approach is to estimate ωm from the following regression:5
logyi1 =∑
m
ω jmcIim+Xiβ
j
c + εi, (2)
where yi1 are the earnings of individual i in the first year since graduation, the super-
script “ j” stands for industry of the first employment, Iim is an indicator variable equal
to one if the individual’s field of study is m, and the subscript “c” stands for the gradu-
ation cohort. Xi includes the county of residence fixed effects, a full-time job indicator,
and the gender of the worker. A regression is estimated for each industry of initial em-
ployment and graduation cohort separately, yielding a set of industry-cohort-specific
wages paid ({ω jmc}) for each major m, industry j, and cohort c.6 We then rank the set
of premia {ω jmc}Jj=1 within each major-cohort cell. The rank, denoted by R jmc, is our
proxy for the quality of the worker-industry match.7 We also define a skill mismatch
indicator based on a cutoff value of the rank:
M jmc = 1(R
j
mc ≤ 3), (3)
where, if an individual from major m is employed by any of the industries paying the
three lowest wage premia, the individual is mismatched.8
For a given major of study m, our objective is to identify the entire vector of effi-
ciency units over all industries, holding the (observed and unobserved) composition of
workers constant in each industry. Ideally, mismatch should be defined using industry-
specific skill premia identified from potential outcomes. However, because there are
many industries, the data demands for instrumental variables are very high: for each
industry it is necessary to find a variable that is conditionally random, shifts the proba-
bility of choosing that industry relative to the other options, and does not directly affect
the outcome variable of interest. In our regression in equation 2, we include many ob-
servable characteristics in Xi and use only the earnings in the first year after graduation,
5This approach is similar to Gottschalk and Hansen (2003), who classify noncollege and college
occupations according to estimated wage premia paid to college-educated workers.
6The cohort interaction is intended to capture major/industry-specific labor demand changes (such
as the skill-biased technology change) which may affect the estimated wage premia and in turn, the
industry rank. For each regression of graduating cohort c, the sample used for estimation includes a five-
year moving window centered around the cohort of graduation (i.e. cohorts c−2,c−1,c,c+1,c+2).
The five-year moving window means that we remove the effects of any transitory industry-specific
shocks on first earnings (α jt in the model).
7If the worker is unemployed for an entire calendar year, no rank is assigned.
8In Section 4, we conduct robustness checks using alternative cutoffs.
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hoping that any remaining bias is small. Note that our definition of mismatch is based
on the ordering of the industry-specific wages, which puts fewer restrictions on our
identification strategy: our measure of mismatch is unbiased so long as the selection
bias does not change the ordering of the skill premia.
As a robustness check, we also use an alternative definition of skill mismatch based
on worker flows from different college majors into different industries. This choice-
based approach does not require the estimation of the skill premia. We explain this
approach in detail in Section 5.2.
3 Data and Sample Selection
The data on workers used in our study are derived from administrative registers and
prepared for research by Statistics Norway. The data covers all Norwegian residents
aged 16–74 years old in the period from 1986 to 2007. We have information about
employment relationships, labor income, educational attainment, field of education
and date of completion, labor market status, and a set of demographic variables such
as gender, age, experience, and marital status. A unique person identifier allows us
to follow workers over time. Likewise, each worker is matched to a firm, allowing
us to identify each worker’s employer. Regional labor market characteristics such as
unemployment rates are also available.
The main focus of the study is college graduates with 13–16 years of education
who graduate between the ages of 20 and 30. We have the exact date of graduation and
the municipality of the college attended for students. We also have the exact date of
initial enrollment and whether students take a shorter or longer time than the scheduled
time for a program. This is important when calculating whether students are delaying
finishing or rushing to finish depending on the business cycle.
The sample used in our main analysis is constructed by first identifying the cohorts
graduating between 1988 and 2003. We then drop those who became self-employed or
returned to school and people for which observations are missing. In our main sample,
we include both men and women. We focus on the first 10 years following graduation
from college.
We define eight categories of field of study based on the international standard for
education (Statistics Norway, 2003). These fields of study are given in Table 1. We
fix the field of study at the graduation year. We drop people whose education relates
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to primary industries or who are in non-categorized fields. The other element used
when calculating the mismatch index is the eight industries defined using the ISIC
classification (Statistics Norway, 1983).9 Our measure of earnings is the sum of pre-
tax market income (from wages and self-employment) and work-related cash transfers,
such as unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, and parental leave benefits.
We use regional (county) level unemployment rates in our regression analysis.
The unemployment rate is taken from the Norwegian Labor and Welfare Organization
(NAV). We exploit one major economic downturn and one smaller downturn plus two
upturns that took place in Norway during the sample period. The national unemploy-
ment rate is reported in Figure 1 for the period 1986–2006. Particularly interesting for
this analysis is the severe recession that took place in Norway at the beginning of the
data period starting in 1988/89. The downturn lasted until 1993, when unemployment
rates began to decrease. This is the deepest and longest-lasting downturn in Norway
since WWII. The unemployment rate rose from 1.5 percent to 5.5 percent, which is a
historically high rate in Norway.10 In addition to the unemployed, about 3 percent of
the labor force were on various labor market programs. One reason why the recession
lasted so long was that a banking crisis occurred in 1991/92 when several large private
banks had to be saved by the government (Steigum, 2010). Following this recession,
growth and employment picked up and a boom occurred around 1998 during which the
unemployment rate decreased to 2.4 percent. The recovery flattened out in 1998, but
lasted until 2001. In 2001–2003 there was a mild recession before a new and strong
expansion started. Figure A3 in the online shows the time series of annual unemploy-
ment rates at the regional level, which our identification relies on. The figure displays
a high degree of regional heterogeneity across regions at any given point in time.
In addition to variables related education and labor market outcomes, in subse-
quent analysis, we also use IQ test scores from Norwegian military records.11 Military
service is compulsory for all able males in Norway. Before entering the service, their
medical and psychological suitability is assessed: this occurs around their 18th birth-
9There is a trade-off in the choice of industry-field classifications. For example, to use more detailed
industry classifications we would have had to combine certain fields of study in order to have a suffi-
ciently large sample for each industry-field-year cell. To obtain a large enough sample for all industries,
we merge agriculture, mining, electricity and water, and construction into one. We also separate out
social services, including health and education, because this comprises 30 percent of employment.
10These rates are based on the number of fully unemployed persons registered at a national insurance
office in a particular week in each year. If the annual unemployment survey data from Statistics Norway
are used, the unemployment rate is about one percentage point higher.
11We explain our use of the IQ scores in Section 4.3.
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day. The IQ measure is a composite score from three timed IQ tests: arithmetic, word
similarities, and figures.12 The composite IQ test score is an unweighted mean of the
three sub-tests. The IQ score is reported in stanine (Standard Nine) units, a method of
standardizing raw scores into a nine-point standard scale with a normal distribution, a
mean of five, and a standard deviation of two.
4 Estimation Results
We begin this section by documenting the short- and long-term effects of graduating in
recessions using the Norwegian data. We then provide empirical evidence that cyclical
skill mismatch is an important mechanism explaining the persistent career loss. Specif-
ically, we examine how skill mismatch changes over the business cycle, and show how
the inclusion of the quality of the first match reduces the estimated effects of initial
labor market conditions.
4.1 The Short- and Long-term Effects of Graduating in a Reces-
sion
Figure 2 shows the experience profiles of log annual real earnings by cohorts. There
are large variations in starting wages across cohorts (connected by dashed lines in
black), which appear strongly correlated with business cycles. The initial differences
gradually fade out and earnings across cohorts converge in a little over five years.
Indeed, the earnings for people who have spent five years in the labor market show
only minor variations over the business cycle (dashed lines in red). Figure 3 shows the
experience profile of unemployment across graduating cohorts. In the first year after
graduation, the rate of unemployment peaks at above 20 percent in the early 1990s
and drops to below 10 percent in late 1990s as the economy recovers from the severe
recession. Unemployment is more cyclical for graduates entering the labor market
(black dashed line) than graduates who have been in the labor market for five years
(red dashed line). These patterns are very similar to those found in studies using data
12The arithmetic test is quite similar to the arithmetic test in the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS) (Sundet, Tambs, Harris, Magnus, and Torjussen, 2005; Cronbach, 1964). The word test is
similar to the vocabulary test in WAIS, and the figures test is similar to the Raven Progressive Matrix
test (Cronbach, 1964). See Sundet, Barlaug, and Torjussen (2004), Sundet et al. (2005), and Thrane
(1977) for details.
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from other countries.
We then investigate the effect of initial labor market conditions on annual earnings,
using the regression framework described in Section 2. Table 2 demonstrates that those
who graduate in recessions suffer from significant earnings loss in the first few years
after college. A one- percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate leads to six
percent lower annual earnings in the first two years after graduation. The losses in
annual earnings reduce to 2.5 percent by the fourth year after graduation and are small
and insignificant thereafter. Compared with Oreopoulos et al. (2012), the magnitude
of the initial earnings loss is quite similar, but the effects are smaller and less persistent
in the long term.
In our setting with a large public sector, as mentioned, it is natural to separate out
the graduates with an education basically qualifying them for public sectors such as
education and health. The reason is that we expect the public sector to be more insu-
lated from national and international business cycle shocks because both the demand
for health and education are local services, and quite independent of demand shocks.
Furthermore, the system of wage negotiations and labor relations are different than in
the private sector (Hunnes, Møen, and Salvanes, 2008). For instance, the public sector
is characterized by a very high union membership rate (90 percent as opposed to 30
percent in the private sector), and centralized wage bargaining is an important part of
wage determination. Indeed, when we disaggregate the sample by dividing graduates
into those majoring in fields that are more likely to work for the public sector (health
and education) and those with a major in other fields, we observe large differences
in terms of how they respond to bad local labor market conditions. Graduates major-
ing in “public” fields have temporary earnings losses that are limited to the first two
years, whereas graduates from other majors suffer from much more persistent earnings
losses that remain significant (at nearly 2 percent) eight years after graduation. Note
that the initial earnings loss is quite similar between public- and private-sector majors
(4.8 percent vs. 6.1 percent). The difference between public- and private-sector majors
materializes a few years after graduation, which may reflect the different wage growth
trajectories of these sectors.13
With generous social assistance and unemployment protection in Norway, workers
might be more likely to choose unemployment rather than working at jobs with sig-
nificant wage reductions. This is confirmed when we examine the effects on indices
13We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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of unemployment in the last three columns. While the effects on annual earnings are
limited to the first three years, the effects on unemployment are strong and persistent.
We find that a one-percentage-point rise in the local unemployment rate increases the
probability of unemployment by 1.4 percentage points in the first year after college,
and the effects are smaller but persistent up to eight years after graduation. Similar
differences between types of majors remain when we use unemployment as the out-
come variable. Compared with students majoring in education and health, graduates
majoring in other fields experience a higher probability of unemployment in all periods
within the first 10 years after graduation.
Given the heterogeneity in the effects of initial business cycle conditions across
different types of majors, in our analysis below, we focus primarily on the graduates
working in other “private” sector fields of study to explain the highly persistent earn-
ings and employment losses.
4.2 The Effect of Recessions on Skill Mismatch
We first provide some descriptive statistics of the mismatch measure we use. Figure
4 plots the adjusted wage estimated from equation (2) across industry-majors over
time. The unweighted mean and standard errors of adjusted wages over all years for
all industries are summarized in Table 1. There are substantial differences in the wage
premia paid for a given type of skill. For example, graduates with a degree in Health
and Welfare are valued most in the Social and Related Community Services sector and
least in the Manufacturing sector. There are also considerable variations in the wage
premia for different skills within an industry. For example, the adjusted log wage for
business majors in the Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services sector
is 12.13, but for those majoring in Humanities and Arts, the adjusted log wage is 11.78.
Figure 5 shows the unweighted average adjusted log wage for each field of study for
all graduating cohorts. Overall, adjusted wages are countercyclical across all fields of
study: they are lower in periods when unemployment rates were high and they rise in
periods when unemployment rates were declining. Graduates majoring in Humanities
and Arts have the lowest wage level, whereas graduates majoring in health are the most
highly paid.
Figure 6 shows the probability of mismatch (defined using equation (3)) in the first
year of graduation by cohort and fields of study. We find large variations in the proba-
bility of mismatch, both across majors and across graduation year. People majoring in
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teaching and health have the lowest level of mismatch in the sample period. For most
majors, the probability of an initial mismatch is generally high during the early 1990s,
falling in the late 1990s, and rising again in the early 2000s. The general pattern cor-
relates positively with the national unemployment rate over the period. Note that, in
the regression framework, this variation across cohorts will be absorbed by the cohort
dummies. The cyclical variations we are exploiting are the variations across regions
within a cohort and across cohorts within the same region.
To identify the cyclical variation in mismatch in a regression framework, we esti-
mate equation (1) using mismatch as the outcome variable. This allows us to control
for permanent differences across graduating regions and graduating cohorts. Table 3
reports the estimated effects of initial regional unemployment rate on match quality by
years since graduation. In columns (1)–(3), we use the rank of the estimated skill pre-
mia (R jmc) as the dependent variable.14 The estimated coefficients β e2 capture changes
in the quality of the industry-major match over time. We find those graduating in reces-
sions are more likely to accept jobs in low-match-quality industries than in industries
they would have entered under normal economic conditions. For workers graduat-
ing in recessions, the downgrading of the industry-major match quality also appears
quite persistent. Interestingly, the effects are mostly driven by graduates majoring in
fields leading to careers in the private sector (column 3). Among graduates majoring
in fields leading to careers in the public sector, we do not find any significant effects
of initial labor market conditions on the subsequent match quality (column 2). Note
that our definition of skill mismatch is fixed within each major and graduating cohort
and invariant over each calendar year. The persistent effects from initial labor market
conditions indicate that a substantial number of mismatched graduates did not switch
to the high-match-quality industries in the long run.
In columns (4)–(6), we repeat our analysis using the mismatch indicator defined
using equation (3) as the outcome variable.15 Among all graduates, column (4) clearly
shows a persistent positive effect on the probability of mismatch from graduating in
a recession. A one percent increase in the regional unemployment rate at the time of
graduation leads to a 2.1-percentage-point increase in the probability of a mismatch
in the first two years following graduation. Given that the average probability of skill
14Recall that we rank all the industries from 1 to 8 (8 being the highest) according to the wage
premium for a given major in a given year.
15In Table A1 in the online appendix, we report the same set of estimates using alternative cutoff
values to define the mismatch indicator.
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mismatch in the first year after graduation is 0.20, this represents an increase of about
10 percent. The effect decreases by about one-quarter by five years after graduation,
suggesting that some initially mismatched college graduates find their way back to
the industries matching their skills. However, even 10 years after labor market en-
trance, the probability of mismatch remains nearly 1.5 percentage points higher for
workers graduating during worse economic conditions. Columns (5)–(6) report results
for graduates majoring in public and private fields, respectively. Graduates from the
private fields are more likely to be mismatched over the entire early careers (column
6).
The finding that temporary macroeconomic shocks can have persistent effects on
the industry-major match quality is striking. This can be explained by credit con-
straints interacting with skill dynamics, which can cause temporary macroeconomic
shocks to generate persistent skill mismatch over the long run.16 The large difference
between the effects on public- and private-sector majors can be explained if demand
shocks in the public sector are less cyclical.
4.3 Cyclical Skill Mismatch and the Long-term Effects of Gradu-
ating in a Recession
To assess whether mismatch can explain the negative effects of entering the labor mar-
ket in bad times, we augment equation (1) with the match quality of the first employ-
ment and estimate it at the individual level:
yit = β1 +∑
e
β e2Ucr0 +∑
e
β e3Ri1 +Ri1×θr+Ri1×ξc+φt +θr+ γe+ γe×θr+ξc+uit ,
(4)
where Ri1 is the match quality (i.e. the rank) fixed effect between individual i and
industry of employment in the first year after graduation. We allow the effect of initial
match quality to vary by years of potential experience, because this alone may have
a persistent effect on the outcome of interest. The interactions between initial match
quality and region (Ri1× θr) and between initial match quality and cohort (Ri1× ξc)
allow for the effect of match quality to differ by region and cohort. Compared with the
model in equation (1), the current set of parameters β e2 identifies the impact of initial
labor market conditions, conditional on the observed match quality in the first year of
16The model in online Appendix A illustrates such a mechanism.
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employment. Note that the inclusion of region, cohort, and year fixed effects already
captures aggregated unobserved changes at the region and cohort level and over time.
Table 4 reports the estimated effects of initial local labor market conditions. We
focus on the subsample of graduates majoring in fields leading to the private sector,
given that the large and persistent impacts on earnings and match quality from ini-
tial labor market conditions are much more pronounced among these individuals. As
the IQ test scores are only available for men (which we use as part of a specifica-
tion check at the end of this section), we further restrict our sample to male graduates
only. The first column of Table 4 presents the estimated effects of initial local labor
market conditions for the subsample of men majoring in private-sector fields. Simi-
lar to our previous result using all graduates in private-sector fields (Table 2, column
3), we find a negative effect on earnings that persists for eight years after graduation.
In column (2), we add dummy variables indicating the match quality of the first em-
ployment. Column (2) shows that both the short- and long-term effects of the initial
conditions are substantially lower. For instance, the short-term effect on log earnings
in the first two years following graduation is lower by almost one half (from -0.037 to
-0.019). Furthermore, the effect three to four years after graduation is lower by just
over one-half (from -0.029 to -0.014) and the effect five to six years after graduation
is insignificant. Conditional on the match quality of the first employment, initial local
labor market conditions have a much smaller and less persistent effect during the early
stages of workers’ careers.
Ideally, we would have liked to compare those who end up in a bad match with the
counterfactual outcome in a good match. This counterfactual outcome is of course not
available, and the variation in worker’s initial match quality (Ri1) that we observe is
potentially endogenous for at least two reasons. First, there might be a positive sort-
ing between industries and workers; individuals with higher unobserved ability may be
more likely to stay in the “right” industry. Therefore, the unobserved ability of the indi-
vidual is an omitted variable related to mismatch and labor market outcomes. Second,
the unobservable component of match quality between the individual and industry may
affect both wages and the observed rank of the first industry of employment (because
industry of employment is an optimal choice). In Section 4.2, we show that the match
quality of the first employment is negatively correlated with the initial unemployment
rate. In general, we should expect the correlation between the error term and match
quality of the first employment to be positive: an individual employed by a “good”
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industry probably has an above-average unobserved match quality and/or individual
ability. In online Appendix B, we illustrate that these two factors lead to a positive
bias (biased towards zero) of the estimated β e2 . Note that any measurement error in our
measure of match quality will tend to attenuate the coefficient on Ri1 to zero and the
associated outcome change will be incorrectly attributed to Ucr0. This would bias β2
away from zero and at least mitigate the positive bias.
In order to partly deal with these selection issues or omitted variable bias, we aug-
ment equation (4) with a measure of cognitive ability observed in our data:
yit = β1 +∑
e
β e2Ucr0 +∑
e
β e3Ri1 +Ri1×θr+Ri1×ξc
+∑
e
β e4Qi+Qi×θr+Qi×ξc+φt +θr+ γe+ γe×θr+ξc+uit , (5)
where Qi are IQ-score fixed effects for individual i.17 While the observed IQ score
is potentially insufficient to fully capture individual ability, a comparison between the
estimated β e2 from equation (5) and the estimated β
e
2 without the IQ controls never-
theless reveals useful information about the importance of selection bias because of
unobserved individual ability. Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) have shown that
there is a strong correlation between IQ scores and labor market outcomes, and when
IQ does not add to the explanatory power in equation (5), it seems reasonable to as-
sume that unobserved ability factors also play a limited role.
The last column in Table 4 reports the estimates when IQ scores are controlled
for as in equation (5). Compared with the estimates in column (2), the estimated
coefficients on initial labor market conditions barely change. We interpret this as an
indication that self-selection based on unobserved individual characteristics is unlikely
to bias our results. The quality of the first employment appears to play a much larger
role in explaining the long-term career loss from graduating in recessions.
To summarize, we find that skill mismatch may be important for explaining the
effects of graduating in recessions. Our findings suggest that the accumulation of
industry-specific human capital is an important mechanism in the recovery process.
Some workers manage to switch back to their high-match-quality industry, and acquire
new skills through on- the-job training. Still, for some workers who are unable to
switch to the right industry, their work skills depreciate slowly over time, leading to
17They include nine dummy variables because the IQ score is reported on a nine-point standard scale
based on stanine (Standard Nine) units.
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persistent earnings losses that are difficult to recover.
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Selectivity Over Initial Labor Market Conditions
In the empirical analysis, we have assumed that the local unemployment rate at the
time of graduation represents an exogenous labor demand shock. If college students
affect the regional unemployment rate through the timing of their graduation, the ini-
tial unemployment rate is endogenous. To test whether there is selective timing of
graduation, we use a variable created by Statistics Norway documenting the number
of semesters a student studies beyond the program duration. From this variable, we
create a dichotomous variable, Dicr, which equals one if a college graduate i delays
graduation. We estimate the following individual-level regression:
Dicr = α1 +α2Uicr+θr+ξc+ vicr, (6)
where Uicr is the unemployment rate at the predicted time of graduation for the indi-
vidual (at age 23), and θr and ξc are regional and cohort fixed effects, respectively. The
first column in Table 5 reports the estimated coefficient α2. It is small and insignifi-
cant, suggesting little evidence of selective timing of graduation in response to local
demand shocks.
In our main empirical model,Uicr is the region of the college from which individual
i graduates. If college graduates affect the regional unemployment rate by searching
for employment opportunities in other regions, the initial unemployment rate may not
be the most relevant determinant of the labor market outcomes. To assess the impor-
tance of this issue, we define a dummy variable Licr = 1 if the region of residence
among workers in the first year following graduation is different from the region of the
school. We use Licr = 1 as our dependent variable and estimate equation (6). Column
2 in Table 5 shows that the estimated coefficient α2 is small and insignificant.18
18In estimating our main empirical model in equation (1), we also attempted to replace the school
region with the region of residence at the time of graduation and use the initial unemployment rate
at the region of residence as the key independent variable. Region of residence might differ from the
school region, because during most of our time period, the majority of students were still recorded in
administrative registers as residing with their parents. We also experimented by clustering our preferred
definition of labor market regions (at the county level) into larger labor market areas (North, Mid-north,
West, South, and East). Neither of the alternatives significantly changed our previous conclusions.
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As a final piece of evidence that there is no selectivity on the initial labor market
conditions, we re-estimate the regression as specified in equation (6) by replacing the
dependent variable with the observed IQ scores (Qi). Column 3 in Table 5 shows that
there is little evidence that observed quality varies with initial labor market conditions.
5.2 Alternative Measure of the First Match Quality
As a robustness check, we use another measure of match quality abstracting from the
industry-specific skill premia estimated in the wage regressions. Rather than looking
at wage premia, we use worker flows from graduation to the industry of the first em-
ployment to define mismatch. For each major m and cohort c, we count the number of
graduates working in each industry j in the first year after graduation (F jmc).19 To en-
sure that we are not simply picking up industries with the highest overall level of labor
demand, we normalize it by total employment in industry j from the same cohort c in
the first year since graduation, as follows:
f jmc =
F jmc
∑mF
j
mc
, (7)
where f jmc is the normalized worker flow into industry j for major m and cohort c.
The level of f jmc will be affected by the absolute size of the major/cohort, but we rank
{ f jmc}8j=1 within major m and cohort c and use this rank as our alternative measure of
match quality.20
Table 6 reports the long-term effects of initial unemployment rate on match qual-
ity defined by the rank of the worker flows (ranging from 1 to 8 with 8 being the
highest). We find that bad initial labor market condition worsens the quality of the
first match and the effects are persistent throughout the early careers. The effects are
driven mainly by graduates with a private-sector major. The effects are qualitatively
similar to the match quality defined by the wage premia (see columns (1)–(3) in Table
19To increase the number of observations in each cohort-industry cell, we use a moving window by
combining cohorts t−2, t−1, t, t+1, and t+2. This also implies that our definition of match quality
is based on a “permanent” rank of worker flows.
20Table A2 in the online appendix reports the average worker flow across different cohorts. Take
graduates majoring in business as an example. 43 percent of the employment in the financial services
sector (within the same cohort) are business majors, whereas only 7 percent of people working in the
health and education sectors majored in business. Therefore, for business majors, the financial services
sector is a better match than the health and education sectors.
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3), although the magnitudes are smaller.
5.3 Isolating the Effect of Labor Market Conditions at Entry
As first pointed out by Oreopoulos et al. (2012), the estimated parameters β e2 from our
baseline empirical model (equation (1)) identify the long-term effects of the unem-
ployment rate at graduation plus the weighted sum of the effect of the unemployment
rates a worker faced during his career.21 It can be interpreted as the average change in
earnings (or other outcome variables) from graduating in a recession, given the regular
evolution of the regional unemployment rate faced afterwards. Another parameter of
interest is to isolate the effect of labor market conditions at entry net of subsequent
effects from exposure to a possibly prolonged recession. This also allows us to as-
sess whether the persistent effect of aggregate unemployment rates at the time of entry
differs from those experienced by more mature workers.
To this end, we follow the strategy proposed by Oreopoulos et al. (2012) and esti-
mate the following extended model:
ycrt = β1 +∑
e
β e2Ucr0 +∑
e
β e3Ucr12 +φt +θr+ γe+ γe×θr+ξc+ucrt , (9)
where Ucr12 = 0.5× (Ucr1 +Ucr2) and β e3 = 0 for e= {1,2}.22 The inclusion of Ucr12
controls for the effects of labor market conditions in the first two years following grad-
uation which are highly correlated with initial labor market condition.23 We allow
21To see this, denote the effect on earnings (or other outcome variables) in experience year e of the
unemployment rate in the labor market during experience year d by βe,d (d < e). Then, the coefficient
on the initial unemployment rate in equation (1) identifies:
plim β̂2
e
= β e2 +
e
∑
d=1
βe,d
cov(Ucr0,Ucrdd)
var(Ucr0)
, (8)
where βe,d is the effect in experience year e of the unemployment rate at experience year d and Ucrdd is
the unemployment rate a worker was exposed to at experience year (d) in the region of residence (rd).
The second term is the sum of the persistent effects of all other unemployment rate in the e years since
graduation.
22We use the average unemployment rate in the first and second experience year because experience
is grouped every two years. In order to compare similarly defined unemployment rates, in this regression
we also control for the fixed effects of region of current residence.
23We only include the local unemployment rate in the first two years following graduation because
they are highly correlated with initial local unemployment rate. Figure A4 in the online appendix shows
the autocovariance structure between subsequent unemployment rates and the initial unemployment rate
(i.e. cov(Ucr0,Ucrdd)). Similar to the evidence presented in Oreopoulos et al. (2012) using Canadian
data, we find that the autocovariance declines quickly to close to zero starting from three years since
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the coefficient on Ucr12 to vary by potential experience (beyond the first two years),
because subsequent exposure to local unemployment rate (Ucr12) may have its own
persistent effects on the outcomes (Beaudry and DiNardo (1991)). β e2 identifies the
impact of labor market conditions at entry abstracting from the impacts of correlated
future labor market conditions.
Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients β e2 from equation (9). The regression
estimates the persistent effect of the initial labor market conditions on log earnings,
unemployment and match quality, net of its correlation with unemployment rate in
the first two years since graduation. In general, compared with Table 2 and the first
three columns in Table 3, the initial unemployment rate effect is reduced by labor
market conditions in the first two years following graduation, but the difference is
small. Interestingly, most of the effect we find, both in the short and long term, is
driven by the shock at the time of graduation alone.
6 Conclusion
The explanations previously suggested for the long-term effects of short-term cyclical
variations in labor market conditions vary from the initial quality of the firm-worker
match to the pro-cyclical effect on promotion. The mechanisms proposed so far have
not paid specific attention to matching supply of heterogeneous skills within graduat-
ing cohorts of graduates and the heterogeneous demand for skills across different in-
dustries. In this paper, we proposed that skill mismatch, defined as mismatch between
the skills supplied by college graduates (measured by the field of study in college) and
skills demanded by hiring industries, is an important mechanism behind the persistent
career loss caused by graduating in recessions.
Using administrative data from Norway, we found a strong countercyclical pattern
of skill mismatch among college graduates entering the labor market. Initial labor
market conditions had a declining but persistent effect on match quality during the
early careers of these graduates. Conditional on match quality of the first employment,
the long-term effects of graduating in a recession faded out much faster, and the short-
term effects were also lower, by as much as 50 percent. Policies that aim at improving
the match quality of the first employment is potentially important in helping those
graduating in a recession avoid long-term career losses.
graduation.
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Figure 2: Experience Profiles of Log Annual Real Earnings by Cohorts
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Note: Unemployment is defined as being registered as unemployed for at least one month in a year or
being in one of the government-sponsored training programs targeting the unemployed.
Figure 3: Experience Profiles of Unemployment by Cohorts
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Note: Adjusted log wages are predicted from a regression of log starting annual wages (in the first year
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and female dummy. The regression is estimated separately for each industry and a graduating cohort
using a five-year moving window centered around the cohort of graduation. Definitions of industry
codes follow the note in Table 1.
Figure 4: Adjusted Starting Log Annual Wages by Industry and Major
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Note: This figure plots the unweighted average adjusted log wage for each field of study over all grad-
uating cohorts. Adjusted log wages are predicted from a regression of log starting annual wages (in the
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dummy and female dummy. The regression is estimated separately for each industry and a graduating
cohort using a five-year moving window centered around the cohort of graduation.
Figure 5: Adjusted Starting Log Annual Wages Over Graduating Cohorts by Major
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Note: This figure plots the probability of mismatch in the first year of graduation by cohort and fields
of studies. The mismatch is defined based on the rank of estimated adjusted wages by cohort and major.
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is estimated separately for each industry and a graduating cohort using a five-year moving window
centered around the cohort of graduation.
Figure 6: Mismatch Indicator Over Graduating Cohorts by Major
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Table 1: The Mean Adjusted Log Starting Wages by Field of Study and Industry of
Initial Employment
Field of study
Humanities Teacher Social Sciences Natural Science Health and Communications
Industry and Arts Training and Law Business and Technology Welfare and Transport
1 11.071 11.170 11.322 11.416 11.448 11.181 11.429
0.032 0.030 0.028 0.024 0.023 0.030 0.026
2 11.684 11.667 11.829 11.860 11.885 11.752 11.859
0.018 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.019 0.017
3 11.697 11.749 11.757 11.925 11.893 11.986 11.919
0.024 0.026 0.023 0.019 0.018 0.022 0.021
4 11.439 11.494 11.438 11.628 11.530 11.592 11.607
0.023 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.023 0.024
5 11.709 11.748 11.756 11.883 11.923 11.762 11.979
0.026 0.028 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.027 0.023
6 11.789 11.838 12.093 12.131 12.134 11.983 12.133
0.016 0.019 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.016 0.015
7 12.114 12.174 12.157 12.155 12.173 12.311 12.180
0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.011
8 11.891 11.853 12.031 11.944 11.954 11.960 12.098
0.012 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011
Note: Adjusted log wages are predicted from a regression of log starting annual wages (in the first year
since graduation) on dummies of field of study, dummies of county of residence, full-time job dummy
and female dummy (see equation (2)). The regression is estimated separately for each industry and a
graduating cohort using a five-year moving window centered around the cohort of graduation. Standard
errors are shown below each estimate. Industries are defined as follows:
1-Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing, Mining and Quarrying, Electricity, Gas and Water, Con-
struction (ISIC, class 1, 2, 4, 5)
2-Manufacturing (ISIC, class 3)
3-Wholesale trade (ISIC, class 61) 4-Retail Trade, Restaurants and Hotels (ISIC, class 62 and 63)
5-Transport, Storage and Communication (ISIC, class 7)
6-Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services (ISIC, class 8)
7-Social and Related Community Services, including education and medical services (ISIC, class 93)
8-Community, Social and Personal Services (ISIC, class 9 excluding 93).
Starting in 1999, industry codes are mapped from the Statistics Norway (1994) standard back to the
Statistics Norway (1983) standard before grouping.
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Table 2: The Effect of Initial Labor Market Conditions on Log Annual Earnings and
Unemployment
Effect by Log Earnings Unemployment
Years of Potential All Public Private All Public Private
Experience (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1-2 -0.061*** -0.048*** -0.061*** 0.014*** 0.003** 0.017***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
3-4 -0.025*** -0.003 -0.036*** 0.005*** -0.000 0.007***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
5-6 -0.008 0.019*** -0.024*** 0.005** 0.000 0.007***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
7-8 -0.006 0.014*** -0.018** 0.003* -0.001 0.005**
(0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
9-10 -0.003 0.008 -0.008 -0.002 -0.005*** -0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
R-square 0.924 0.893 0.921 0.859 0.637 0.861
Observations 2641 2641 2641 2641 2641 2641
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Coefficients reported in the table are for the initial
local unemployment rate measured in percentage points. Public refers to graduates majoring in Teacher
Training and Pedagogy and Health, Welfare and Sport. Private refers to all other graduates. We first
cluster our panel data into cells defined by cohort, calendar year, and region of graduation. We then
estimate equation (1) weighted by the corresponding cell sizes. Standard errors are clustered at region
of graduation and cohort level.
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Table 3: The Effect of Initial Labor Market Conditions on the Quality of the Industry-
Major Match and the Probability of Mismatch
Effect by Match Quality Mismatch Indicator
Years of Potential All Public Private All Public Private
Experience (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1-2 -0.064*** -0.006 -0.087*** 0.021*** 0.003 0.030***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.018) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
3-4 -0.038** 0.016 -0.058*** 0.017*** -0.002 0.025***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
5-6 -0.021 0.024* -0.040** 0.015*** -0.002 0.022***
(0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
7-8 -0.015 0.023* -0.027 0.014*** -0.002 0.021***
(0.020) (0.014) (0.021) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
9-10 -0.020 0.018 -0.027 0.015*** -0.001 0.021***
(0.019) (0.014) (0.020) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
R-square 0.864 0.630 0.894 0.821 0.521 0.842
Observations 2641 2641 2641 2641 2641 2641
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Coefficients reported in the table are for the initial
local unemployment rate measured in percentage points. Public refers to graduates majoring in Teacher
Training and Pedagogy and Health, Welfare and Sport. Private refers to all other graduates. We first
cluster our panel data into cells defined by cohort, calendar year, and region of graduation. We then
estimate equation (1) weighted by the corresponding cell sizes. Standard errors are clustered at region
of graduation and cohort level.
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Table 4: The Effect of Initial Labor Market Conditions on Log Annual Earnings: the
Role of Initial Match Quality
Effect by Years of Log Earnings
Potential Experience (1) (2) (3)
1-2 -0.037*** -0.019*** -0.020***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
3-4 -0.029*** -0.014** -0.015**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
5-6 -0.021** -0.007 -0.008
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
7-8 -0.024*** -0.009 -0.010
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
9-10 -0.020** -0.006 -0.006
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
IQ No No Yes
Match quality No Yes Yes
R-square 0.132 0.182 0.192
Observations 694183 694183 694183
Note: * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01. Coefficients reported in the table are for the initial local
unemployment rate measured in percentage points. The sample includes all male graduates majoring in
fields leading to the private sector. In columns (1)–(3), estimates are based on equations (1), (4) and (5),
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at region of graduation and cohort level.
Table 5: The Correlation of Initial Labor Market Conditions with Delayed Graduation,
Regional Mobility, and IQ of Graduating Cohorts
Delayed Graduation Regional Mobility IQ Score
(1) (2) (3)
Regional Unemployment Rate -0.005 -0.013 -0.019
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014)
R2 0.025 0.044 0.051
Observations 191969 214173 138879
Note: Estimates are based on equation (6), and cohort and region fixed effects are also included in the
estimation (but not reported). Coefficients reported in the table are for the initial local unemployment
rate measured in percentage points. Standard errors are clustered at region of graduation.
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Table 6: The Effect of Initial Labor Market Conditions on the Quality of the Industry-
Major Match: Worker-flow Measure
Effect by Match Quality
Years of Potential All Public Majors Private Majors
Experience (1) (2) (3)
1-2 -0.024* -0.001 -0.029*
(0.014) (0.013) (0.018)
3-4 -0.027* -0.001 -0.034*
(0.015) (0.013) (0.017)
5-6 -0.027* 0.004 -0.041**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.017)
7-8 -0.027* 0.008 -0.039**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
9-10 -0.023 0.006 -0.025
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
R-square 0.780 0.637 0.740
Observations 2641 2641 2641
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Coefficients reported in the table are for the initial
local unemployment rate measured in percentage points. Public refers to graduates majoring in Teacher
Training and Pedagogy and Health, Welfare and Sport. Private refers to all other graduates. Match
quality is defined by the rank of worker flows between major and industry (see Section 5.2 for details).
We first cluster our panel data into cells defined by cohort, calendar year, and region of graduation. We
then estimate equation (1) weighted by the corresponding cell sizes. Standard errors are clustered at
region of graduation and cohort level.
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A How Skill Mismatch Can Arise Over the Business
Cycle—An Analytical Framework
In this section, we provide a simple analytical framework to demonstrate how skill
mismatch might arise and how it relates to the business cycle: mismatch may occur
throughout the cycle, but in the model counter-cyclical mismatch is inefficient. In the
model, workers would like to work in the field they studied for, since this better pre-
serves and maintains the skill they accumulated in school. Such skill dynamics are
similar to those in the model of vintage human capital developed in Violante (2002),
in which skills are vintage-specific to the technology in one industry. With techno-
logical progress, original skills are only partially transferable to the new technology,
exhibiting as skill loss for individuals.1
Let there be two industries, 1 and 2, with a large number of firms that are homoge-
neous within each industry. Recent college graduates are endowed with a skill bundle
zi = (z1i ,z
2
i ), where z
j
i is the productivity of worker i matched to a firm in industry j.
∗All authors: NHH Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics, Helleveien 30,
5045 Bergen, Norway. Emails: Kai.Liu@nhh.no, Kjell.Salvanes@nhh.no, Erik.Sorensen@nhh.no.
Corresponding author: Erik Ø. Sørensen, phone (+47) 55 95 94 36. We thank Peter Gottschalk, Robert
Moffitt, and the participants at several seminars and conferences for helpful comments and discussions.
This research is supported by the Research Council of Norway Grant 202445.
1See also Neal (1995) for empirical evidence using displaced workers.
1
Some graduates are ex ante more productive in the first industry (z1i > z
2
i ). Such a
worker would have an ex ante expectation of working in industry 1, and we say that
such a worker has been trained for industry 1. We shall consider it a form of mismatch
if he or she works in industry 2. Similarly, the other workers are trained for industry 2.
We assume that firms are hit by an industry-wide productivity shocks, α j. This
is a random variable realized in each period, that individuals can observe before they
choose what industry to work in. We normalize the expectations of α1 and α2 to zero.
When worker i is matched to industry j, production is
y(i, j;α) = z ji +α
j. (1)
We assume that workers are paid their marginal product, w(i, j;α) = y(i, j;α), and
allow the αs to be potentially correlated in the cross-section but assume that the current
period realization of α is not informative about future values of α .
We further assume workers to be risk-neutral, and to live for two periods. In each
period, they choose one of the two states in the labor market: they work in industry 1,
or they work in industry 2. Denote the choices as Dit ∈ {1,2}. The value to a young
worker i of working in industry j in period t is
Vt(i, j) = wt(i, j;αt)+βEt max{wt+1(i,1;αt+1,Dit),wt+1(i,2;αt+1,Dit)} . (2)
The expectation is taken with respect to the second period’s realization of the industry-
wide productivity shock αt+1, and β is the discount factor. The current choice can
affect future wages because the evolution of skills, zit , might depend on the worker’s
choice of industry. We assume that skills that are not used depreciate at rate γ ,
z jit+1 =
z
j
it× (1− γ), if Dit 6= j,
z jit , if Dit = j.
(3)
In the case of unemployment, both types of skills depreciate.2
Considering first choice in the second period, it is clear that individuals with z1(1−
γ)+α1 ≥ z2 +α2 will be offered higher wages in industry 1 regardless of their first-
period choice. This defines a region in which α2 ≤ α1 +(z1− z2)− γz1. Similarly, if
2Note that this model is isomorphic to a model in which workers accumulate sector specific skills in
the sector they work in only.
2
α2≥α1+(z1−z2)+γz2, individuals work in industry 2 regardless of their first-period
choice. There is, however, a band in between, in which choice in the second period is
determined by choice in the first period. This is illustrated in panel (a) of Figure A1,
with the cutoffs being parallel lines with slopes of unity and vertical distance γ(z2−z1).
Choices in the first period have an effect on choices in the second period, so even if the
realizations of αs are not persistent, outcomes (wages and matches to industry) will be
persistent because of the skill dynamics.
Choices in the first period are made with regard to the expected depreciation of
skills before entering the second period. However, because the αs are not persistent,
the differences in future values between working in industry 1 and industry 2 today do
not involve current realizations of α . This means that the optimal cutoff in the period
is a line with slope of unity in α space, illustrated in panel (b) of Figure A1.
Workers who graduate with skills z1i > z
2
i expect to work in industry 1 rather than
industry 2. However, as they enter the labor market, α is realized, and there is some
probability that wages in industry k are high enough to ensure that V (i,2) > V (i,1)
even when z1i > z
2
i . We say that these individuals are efficiently mismatched when
they end up working in a different industry than they trained for because of transitory
shocks to the labor market. This involves no loss to society or the workers. In order to
induce mismatch, current wage benefits to the mismatch must not only be positive, but
also larger than the increased future depreciation of skills.
To illustrate the role of the business cycle in this model, decompose α such that
α jt = ζt +ν
j
t ,
in which ζt is a cyclical factor shared by both industries and ν jt is an industry compo-
nent independent of the cyclical factor. ν jt . The cyclical component does not impact
the difference in the value of industries 1 and 2, it shifts the α-values parallel to the
cutoffs in Figure A1, and the extent of efficient mismatch is not affected.3
In the model so far, there is no unemployment and all outcomes are efficient. But
assume now that workers are credit-constrained and need to achieve a minimum con-
sumption level c, which can, if necessary, be financed with unemployment benefits
(which we for simplicity also fix at c). Now only jobs with α j ≥ c− z j are feasible
3In a modification in which industry-wide productivity works multiplicatively instead of additively
as in (1) efficient mismatch would be pro-cyclical because in this form, the gains from jumping to the
higher productivity sector increase with the cyclical component.
3
matches. In Figure A2 we have drawn this for a worker trained for industry 1; the
dashed lines indicate the feasibility constraints. The area A is the set of α-realizations
such that neither industry can help the worker realize the minimum consumption re-
quirement, and the worker collects unemployment benefits instead. However, there is
now also a triangular area B in which the worker would, barring the market inefficien-
cies, choose to work in industry 1. This would induce a current period loss relative to
industry 2; this loss would be part of an investment in skill maintenence. Being credit
constrained, however, this worker cannot finance his or her consumption requirement
while maintaining the skills he or she trained for, and is forced to work in industry 2.
We say that such a worker is inefficiently mismatched.
While we saw that the cyclical component of the productivity shock shared by both
sectors was neutral with respect to mismatch without market frictions, this is no longer
the case with the credit constraint. In good times, the α-realizations are moved to the
northeast of Figure A2, and fewer people are forced to accept a mismatch because of
credit constraints (in the B area), leading inefficient mismatch to be countercyclical. If
industry-specific shocks are highly correlated, we will tend to see more unemployment,
because such shocks cannot be buffered by workers going to work in industries other
than the ones they trained for. If the shocks are less correlated there will be more
mismatches. Depreciation of skills that are not used will lead to mismatch having
persistent effects even if the shocks are transitory. Mismatch will persist both with
and without the presence of credit constraints, but with credit constraints there will be
stronger long-term effects on realized wages because workers also accept inefficient
mismatches.
In our model, much of apparent mismatch between field of study and industry of
work might be efficient, and would not a concern for policymakers, but such efficient
mismatch is not countercyclical. On the other hand, credit constraints and a preference
for consumption smoothing (modelled as a minimum consumption requirement) leads
to countercyclical and inefficient mismatch that would be cause for public concern.
The complimentarity between schooling and labor market experience implies that such
mismatch can have long- lasting effects even if productivity shocks are transitory.
Our model relies on a stylized and symmetric model of additive productivity shocks
to sectors. While our main conclusions are robust to making the productivity shocks
multiplicative, other modifications (such as including within-sector heterogeneity in
labour demand with a countercyclical variance (Lilien, 1982)) could dampen and pos-
4
sible reverse the implication that countercyclical mismatch is inefficient.
B Potential Bias in Estimating Equation (4)
In a multivariate context it is difficult to sign the biases of the OLS coefficient on Ucr0.
As an illustration, we derive the bias from an analysis of the OLS estimates for the
following simplified equation:
yit = β1 +β2Ucr0 +β3Ri1 + εit . (4)
The OLS estimate for the coefficient on initial unemployment rate is:
β̂2 = β2 +
σ̂rrσ̂uε − σ̂urσ̂rε
σ̂uuσ̂rr− σ̂2ur
,
where σ̂ab denotes the sample covariance between variable a and b. Ucr0 is exogenous
by our identifying assumption, hence σuε = 0. Therefore, the asymptotic bias is
− σurσrε
σuuσrr(1−ρ2ur)
.
The error term uit may contain individual unobserved ability and some unobserv-
able component of match quality between the individual and the industry of first em-
ployment. In Section 4.2, we have shown that match quality of first employment is
negatively correlated with initial unemployment rate (σur < 0). In general, we expect
the correlation between the error term and match quality of first employment to be pos-
itive, σrε > 0. Taken together, these two factors lead to a positive bias of the estimated
β2.
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Figure A4: Auto-covariance Structure of Local Unemployment Rate
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Table A2: The Mean Worker Flows by Field of Study and Industry of Initial Employ-
ment
Field of study
Humanities Teacher Social Sciences Natural Science Health and Communications
Industry and Arts Training and Law Business and Technology Welfare and Transport
1 0.019 0.026 0.029 0.164 0.688 0.025 0.048
2 0.037 0.028 0.050 0.223 0.580 0.038 0.044
3 0.035 0.023 0.035 0.412 0.392 0.053 0.050
4 0.087 0.089 0.108 0.377 0.188 0.108 0.043
5 0.050 0.039 0.067 0.331 0.330 0.040 0.143
6 0.031 0.013 0.096 0.430 0.376 0.022 0.032
7 0.044 0.236 0.078 0.073 0.103 0.455 0.011
8 0.053 0.049 0.205 0.175 0.158 0.078 0.281
Worker flows between major of study and industry of first employment, normalized by the size of the
industry employment. See Section 5.2 in the main paper for details. Industries are defined as follows:
1-Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing, Mining and Quarrying, Electricity, Gas and Water, Con-
struction (ISIC, class 1, 2, 4, 5)
2-Manufacturing (ISIC, class 3)
3-Wholesale trade (ISIC, class 61) 4-Retail Trade, Restaurants and Hotels (ISIC, class 62 and 63)
5-Transport, Storage and Communication (ISIC, class 7)
6-Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services (ISIC, class 8)
7-Social and Related Community Services, including education and medical services (ISIC, class 93)
8-Community, Social and Personal Services (ISIC, class 9 excluding 93).
Starting in 1999, industry codes are mapped from the Statistics Norway (1994) standard back to the
Statistics Norway (1983) standard before grouping.
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